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Although statutory exemptions from the antitrust laws proliferate
as government involvement in economic activity increases,' the courts
in most instances studiously avoid creating their own exemptions.'
When immunities from the antitrust laws have been granted by the
Supreme Court, great care has been taken to ascertain that the interests
of the public were under other legislative protection.' Yet two recent
cases, exempting any transaction involving "valid governmental ac-
tion," threaten to curb the effectiveness of the antitrust laws. These
cases exempt not only legislatively authorized actions by government
agencies but also unauthorized contracts between private parties and
the agencies.
The first case, E. W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts
Port Authority,4 shields from the antitrust laws an exclusive contract
between a government agency and a private party for services within
the responsibility of the agency. The second, Hecht v. Pro-Football,
Inc.,5 relying almost solely on Wiggins, extends immunity to a trade-
restraining contract for the use of a public facility between a private
party and the government agency responsible for managing the facility.
Hecht, Kagan, and Miller, joint venturers desiring to organize a
second professional football team in Washington, D.C., sought treble
damages and injunctive relief against the owners of a professional
football team (the Washington Redskins), the National Football
League, and the D.C. Armory Board, the public authority which man-
ages Robert F. Kennedy Stadium in the District of Columbia. Plain-
tiffs saw a violation of the Sherman Act in the Armory Board's lease
of the stadium to the Washington Redskins with a provision that no
other professional football team could use the facility for thirty years."
' E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964) (exempting from the antitrust laws transactions
approved by the SEC, FCC, CAB, ICC, and FPC); see Note, Application of the
Sherman Act to Attempts to Influence Government Action, 81 HARV. L. REV. 847
(1968); Comment, Alabama Power Company v. Alabama Electric Cooperative:
Rural Electrification and the Antitrust Laws-Irresistible Force Meets Immovable
Object, 55 VA. L. REv. 325, 344 & nn.102 & 103 (1969), and sources and examples
cited therein.
2 United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361, 368 (1967); Carnation
Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conf., 383 U.S. 213, 218 (1966) ; United States v. Phila-
delphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963); California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482,
485 (1962).
3 See, e.g., United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965);
Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961);
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) ; Costilo, Antitrust's Newest Quagmire: The
Noerr-Pennington Defense, 66 MicH. L. Rsv. 333, 343-44 (1967).
4362 F2d 52 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966).
-312 F. Supp. 472 (D.D.C. 1970).
6Plaintiffs claimed under § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964) for
alleged violations of §§ 1-3 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1964).
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But District Judge Jones granted the defendants' motions for summary
judgment because the exclusive lease was a valid governmental action.'
Judge Jones rests his opinion almost entirely on the valid govern-
mental action rationale of Wiggins, the only judicial foundation for
exempting trade-restraining contracts between private contractors and
government agencies empowered to manage public facilities. Both
decisions erroneously assume that the delegation of power to manage a
public facility confers an immunity from the antitrust laws for all of the
agency's actions. This assumption is based on a misreading of the
three Supreme Court authorities cited in both cases: 8 Parker v.
Brown,9 Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc.,'" and United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington.'
Furthermore, this assumption once made precludes judicial considera-
tion of the precise scope of the powers delegated to the government
agency, and of the corollary question of legislative or executive con-
sideration of the benefits of regulation as opposed to competition.
I. THE Parker EXEMPTION
The Supreme Court in Parker v. Brown ' faced a challenge to a
raisin marketing scheme under California's Agricultural Prorate Act,
legislation designed in part to avoid debilitating competition in the
industry by placing a portion of each grower's crop within the control
of a committee of growers authorized to determine when conditions
favored sale. The Court sustained this program only after finding that
the state legislature had decided that a form of public regulation was
preferable to free competition. 3 The trade-restraining activities were
exempt from the antitrust laws because they were state actions. The
Parker exception to antitrust prohibitions thus turns on the prerequisite
that "[t] he state itself exercises its legislative authority in making the
regulation and in prescribing the conditions of its application." 14
By contrast, neither in Wiggins nor in Hecht was the agency
delegated the legislature's power to regulate a particular facet of com-
merce; nor had the legislature determined that regulation was the
greater good.
Although never facing the question of congressional consideration
of a professional football monopoly in Washington, D.C., the court in
Hecht does conclude that Congress impliedly authorized the granting
7 312 F. Supp. at 477.
8 362 F.2d at 55-56; 312 F. Supp. at 475.
9 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
10 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
1381 U.S. 657 (1965).
32317 U.S. 341 (1943).
13A similar reading of Parker is found in George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v.
Paddock Pool Bldrs., Inc., 424 F.2d 25, 30 (Ist Cir. 1970), discussed at text accom-
panying notes 33-38 infra.
14 317 U.S. at 352.
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of a long-term lease with the Redskins.15 But neither the legislative
history nor the Armory Board's enabling act itself implies authoriza-
tion of an exclusive lease.'6 The conclusion should have been that
Congress did not delegate to the Armory Board the power to make a
trade-restraining contract.
But Hecht relied on Wiggins. Legislatively charged with man-
aging Logan Airport for Boston, the Port Authority executed an
exclusive ground services contract with Butler Aviation-Boston, Inc.,
a competitor of Wiggins Airways." Although the First Circuit ruled
that the contract constituted valid governmental action, the Authority's
enabling statute contains no indication that the Massachusetts legis-
lature delegated to the Authority the power to authorize a ground
services monopoly at Logan Airport.'8 Nor did the court suggest that
the legislative history implied such a delegation.' 9
The Wiggins court thus exploited the language of Parker defining
an exemption of governmental action:
We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in
its history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain
a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its
legislature. . . . The Sherman Act makes no mention of
the state as such, and gives no hint that it was intended to
restrain state action or official action directed by a state.
20
By ignoring the reliance of Parker on a legislative decision to sub-
stitute regulated monopoly or oligopoly for competition, both Wiggins
and Hecht permit the Parker exemption to cloak with immunity every
contract with a government agency.
II. THE Noerr-Pennington EXEMPTION
Both Wiggins and Hecht cite the Supreme Court decisions in
Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.
21
and United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington I for the prop-
osition that efforts by private parties to obtain favorable trade-
restraining legislative or administrative action are beyond the scope
of the antitrust laws.
Noerr, the earlier decision, involved a publicity campaign waged
by the railroads to weaken the competitive position of the trucking
industry by influencing the passage and enforcement of laws. Re-
15 See 312 F. Supp. at 477.
16See H.R. REP. No. 2146, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5, 12 (1958); D.C. CODE
ANt. §§ 2-1720 to -1729 (1966).
17 362 F.2d at 54.
18 See Mass. Selected Special Laws 1956, ch. 465, in 10 MAss. ANIN. LAws (1967).
19 See 362 F.2d at 55.
20 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. at 350-51, quoted in Wiggins, 362 F.2d at 55-56.
21365 U.S. 127 (1961).
22 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
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versing a judgment for the truckers, the Court found that efforts to
influence the passage or enforcement of legislation, regardless of anti-
competitive motive, could not constitute a Sherman Act violation.
First,
the whole concept of representation depends upon the ability
of the people to make their wishes known to their representa-
tives. To hold that the government retains the power to act
in this representative capacity [to restrain trade] and yet hold,
at the same time, that the people cannot freely inform the
government of their wishes would impute to the Sherman Act
a purpose to regulate, not business activity, but political
activity . ... 23
Second, the Court feared that a contrary holding would pose sub-
stantial constitutional questions.'
Noerr was followed four years later in Pennington. As part of a
conspiracy to drive small operators out of business, union officials and
large coal mine operators combined to persuade the Secretary of Labor
to establish a high minimum wage for employees of coal companies
supplying the TVA. Rejecting the Sixth Circuit's restrictive inter-
pretation of Noerr, the Supreme Court held that the right to petition
public officials constituted a Sherman Act defense regardless of " 'a
purpose or intent to further a conspiracy to violate a statute.' "5 The
Court remanded the case for determination of damages caused solely
by the other aspects of the anticompetitive conspiracy.
In both cases the alleged antitrust violation was lobbying for
government action in restraint of trade. In Noerr the power of the
Pennsylvania legislature to consider, and of the governor to veto, a law
favorable to the trucking industry was clear and needed no discus-
sion; in Pennington the Court noted the Secretary of Labor's authoriza-
tion under the Walsh-Healey Act to establish a minimum wage.26  The
restraint of trade sought in Noerr was legislative and executive;
in Pennington, legislatively authorized. In this respect Pennington
resembles Parker.7  But in Wiggins, unlike Pennington and Parker,
there is no indication that the legislature intended to delegate to the
Port Authority its power to make an exclusive ground services contract
at Logan Airport.2 And in Hecht, Congress apparently did not
include among the Armory Board's powers the authority to grant an
23 365 U.S. at 137.
2 4 Id. at 138.
25 381 U.S. at 669-70.
26 Id. at 660; see 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1964).
27 Similar to Parker is the recent case of Sun Valley Disposal Co. v. Silver
State Disposal Co., 420 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1969), in which the Clark County Com-
mission, acting pursuant to statutory authorization by the Nevada legislature, sold
the defendant an exclusive franchise to sell garbage collection services in the unin-
corporated portion of the county, thereby driving the plaintiff out of business.
2 Text accompanying notes 17-19 supra.
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exclusive lease for Kennedy Stadium. 9 Thus, although Wiggins and
Hecht did not turn on lobbying efforts, the Supreme Court's two
lobbying decisions bolster the proposition that restraints of trade by
government agencies are legal only when the legislature specifically
empowers the agency to ignore the antitrust laws.
The proposition finds further support in the Supreme Court's
decision in Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.,3"
in which the anticompetitive actions of a corporate purchasing agent
of the Canadian Government were assailed. The Court refused to hold
the defendant exempt from the antitrust laws apparently because the
defendant was not truly a public body and was itself a principal actor
in the Sherman Act conspiracy. But another reason for finding
liability was that "there was 'no indication that the Controller or any
other official within the structure of the Canadian Government ap-
proved or would have approved of joint efforts to monopolize the
production and sale of vanadium .... " 31 This fact the Court con-
sidered sufficient to distinguish the case from Noerr, and the dis-
tinction was subsequently continued in Pennington.
32
In sum, then, Wiggins and Hecht create a class of exemptions
under the rubric of "valid governmental action" which has no solid
foundation in Parker, Noerr, or Pennington.
III. TOWARD A NEW TEST
Fortunately, a crack has appeared in the Wiggins doctrine. The
First Circuit in George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders,
Inc.' espoused much the same interpretation of the three earlier
Supreme Court decisions as that urged herein. Whitten involved a
challenge to efforts by a swimming pool builder to persuade local
government agents authorized to construct pools to adopt bid speci-
fications to which competing builders could not conform. Judge Coffin
ruled that the defendant's actions fell outside the Parker exemption
because the statutes empowering local officials to purchase pools
specifically required competitive bidding, a requirement which contra-
dicted any suggestion that the legislature had authorized the adoption
of exclusionary specifications.34
The court correctly distinguished Noerr and Pennington on two
grounds. First, the "guile, falsity, and threats" of Paddock did not
constitute "an effort to influence the passage or enforcement of laws." 35
29 Text accompanying notes 15-16 supra.
30 370 U.S. 690 (1961).
31381 U.S. at 671 n.4 (quoting Continental Ore, 370 U.S. at 706). For a fuller
discussion of Contiwntal Ore, see Comment, American Antitrust Law and Canadian
Patent Rights, 118 U. PA. L. Rv. 983, 1000-01 (1970).
32 See 381 U.S. at 671 n.4.
33424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1970).
341d. at 31. This is the same court that decided Wiggins.
Id. at 32.
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Second, the bidding officials were not "vested with significant policy-
making discretion ;" " had Paddock desired a change in the legislative
policy that pool construction contracts be awarded competitively, it
should have approached the legislature3
The decision thus recognized that an antitrust exemption for valid
governmental action, or for efforts to obtain such action, depends
initially on an inquiry into the validity of the action." The Supreme
Court had no need to discuss this question in Parker or Noerr, but
it touched on it in both Pennington and Continental Ore. In assuming
that the Port Authority and the Armory Board had the "power" to
make exclusive contracts, rather than examining whether the legis-
latively granted authority extended this far, the Wiggins and Hecht
courts strayed from the path of immunity charted by Parker, Noerr,
and Pennington. A court should exempt agency action from the
antitrust laws only after it is satisfied that the legislature specifically
delegated to the agency the power to regulate by restraint of trade.
Besides its validity under the Supreme Court precedents, this test is
supported by substantial policy considerations. First, judicially created
immunities from the antitrust laws should be strictly limited to the
problems they address. In Noerr and Pennington the Supreme Court
sought to alleviate the tension between the Sherman Act's prohibition
of joint efforts in restraint of trade and the first amendment guarantee
of the right to petition government officials. Second, innumerable
federal, state, and local facilities are administered by agencies like the
Port Authority and the Armory Board. Without this check, agencies
governing every aspect of the public sector could make trade-restraining
contracts with private parties in complete disregard of the advantages
of competition. Whenever an administrative agency, chosen for its
narrow expertise in operating a public facility, may exalt regulation
over competition even though the legislature has neither itself weighed
the merits nor decided specifically to delegate such power, the public
is deprived of the protection of the antitrust laws.
The proposed standard would eliminate only the blanket im-
munity which the Wiggins and Hecht decisions have drawn over
agency contracts. Although an agency and its private contractors
would no longer obtain dismissals of antitrust complaints, a court could
still find on the merits that their trade-restraining contracts fell within
the rule of reason and thus did not violate the antitrust statutes. But
the courts in Wiggins and Hecht never reached this question and thus
denied the public the protection to which it was entitled.
36 Id. at 33.
7 Id.
38 1d. at 30 ("[T]he assertion that an act is 'valid governmental action .
suggests inquiry rather than ends it.'") (quoting Comment, supra note 1n, at 345)
(deletions by the court).
